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Local Taxation: Principles and Scope   
by Paul Bernd Spahn,  
University of Frankfurt am Main  
 
1. Introduction 
There is broad agreement among economists as well as political scientists that many public 
services should be provided at low level of government in order to enhance the efficiency of 
the public sector and to increase its responsiveness to voters' preferences and demand for 
collective services.  The European Union has explicitly recognized the principle of 
"subsidiarity" in its intergovernmental relations by which public functions should be 
exercised at the lowest possible tier of government unless they are positively provided more 
effectively at a higher level.   
The theory of federalism has established an operational framework for assigning 
expenditure functions to the various levels of government, central, state and local.  The 
literature is not reviewed in this paper.1  It can be observed, however, that, in practice, 
expenditure assignment follows the theoretical guidelines rather closely, and that there is 
little variety, in principle, as to the assignment of such functions like defense, foreign policy, 
and international trade to the central government, and education, health, or housing to lower 
levels of responsibility.  
However, the decentralization of public functions raises the question of local finance and 
taxation in particular.  While guidelines to local taxation can also be found in the theory of 
federalism, their impact on actual arrangements is remarkably weak.  The way local services 
are financed in different countries varies widely.  While Scandinavian countries typically raise 
significant local revenue from own taxes (on average as high as 15 percent of GDP), local 
budgets in Austria, Germany, France, Japan and the United States also rely heavily on local 
taxation (albeit at a lower level; see chart 1). However, many countries finance local budgets 
mainly through grants (apart from the Scandinavian countries--which also use grants 
intensively--, in particular Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).2  Most scholars 
agree, however, that local taxation is an important part of local autonomy that is so 
cherished by economists and political scientists alike.   
This paper attempts to summarize main principles that govern local finance and local 
taxation in particular, and to discuss their implications.  While some of the criteria will 
support each other guiding into the same direction, others are in sharp contradiction to each 
other.  It has to be acknowledged that the various principles discussed must conjointly 
determine the scope for local taxation.  One criterion may be binding while all other 
principles rank a particular tax favorably as a local revenue source.  If local taxation is to be 
strengthened, this calls for the easing of the binding constraint whenever this is feasible 
through tax policy and administrative or organizational measures. 
                         
1 See, however, the "classical" contribution of Oates (1972), and a more recent review of the 
literature in Walsh (1993).  
2 When comparing local internationally, it has to be recognized that the federal countries 
(Austria, Germany, the United States, Canada and Australia) also have an important middle 
tier, which performs many of the functions that are assigned to local government in unitary 
states. 
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2. Principles of local taxation 
The paper discusses the following principles for local finance and taxation: 
1. Local accountability 
2. Tax-benefit link 
3. Non-distortion 
4. Regional equity and long-term efficiency 
5. Reliability and stability of tax bases 
6. Tax-sharing as implicit insurance, and 
7. Administrative simplicity. 
 
2.1 Local accountability 
Local politicians should be responsive to the expressed preferences of their local citizens, or 
encounter defeat in local elections.  This is the basic principle of accountability of local 
policy makers, and it is essential both for economic efficiency and democratic 
representation.  The principle calls for own tax bases of local governments, and it works 
against the financing through grants or tax sharing with higher levels of government.  
General revenue raised by and transferred from other levels of government tends to blur the 
issue of local responsibility and accountability.  The principle also supports the quest for 
policy discretion of local politicians and parliaments, and it entails the right to determine 
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their own tax rates.3 
Discretion in local tax policy is a necessary, but not sufficient conditions for accountability.  
Accountability also implies that local taxes be borne by local citizens. There must be 
equivalence between the provision of local public goods and the tax carried by local voter-
citizens. If taxes can be exported onto taxpayers of other jurisdictions, accountability is 
reduced as local voters can shift the burden of financing the local budget onto others. Local 
incidence or non-exportability of the tax must be valid at least at the margin, for 
incremental or higher-quality services, while standard local services might be finance 
through transfers from other jurisdictions. However, standard local services must be defined 
in a way so as to avoid strategic behavior, i.e. they must be outside the control of local 
government. 
The accountability criterion favors a local personal income or a property tax.  A tourist tax or 
local business taxes rank poorly under this principle because these taxes can usually be 
"exported" to other jurisdictions. 
Accountability also calls for a strict separation of local public budgets and entrepreneurial 
activities of local government.  While the local budget is subject to voters' control and is 
ultimately financed through taxation, companies--although public--operate outside the 
electoral process and should exclusively be subject to market discipline.  This does not 
preclude public ownership of such firms, or the use of profits for financing public budgets; 
neither does it preclude subsidies to local firms where they are related to public benefits and 
subject to political control.  
 
2.2 Benefit-tax link 
The benefit-tax-link principle emphasizes efficiency aspects of local taxation as to the 
provision of public goods.  If a link can be established between a tax and the willingness to 
pay for a public service, the tax plays a role similar to a price in a quid-pro-quo market 
transaction. This would enhance individual (and/or collective) welfare in the provision of 
public goods. While market prices will automatically emerge in functioning markets for 
private goods, a tax-price for public goods is more difficult to establish. Yet for many local 
services fees and user charges as well as contributions of beneficiaries to the financing of 
local investment projects can be defined and employed successfully.  
A tourist tax -- although in conflict with the accountability criterion -- can be defended 
under the benefit-tax principle as long as it is sensed to be an equivalent to a payment for 
local services received. Furthermore, the principle works in favor of local business taxes 
whenever local services are perceived as factor inputs by local firms and hence "purchased" 
through the tax. Although one may object to the business tax on grounds that it can be 
"exported" to other jurisdictions and thus fails to strengthen accountability at the local level, 
the argument is weak when taking an integral view of the tax.  Moreover, the objection rests 
on very narrow assumption as to the shifting of the tax. 
It is not certain, for instance, that a local business tax is shifted onto producer prices and 
thus "exportable" as held by its opponents.  The tax may represent payment for local inputs 
that would otherwise appear in private costs of the firm.  This is true whenever the benefit-
tax link prevails.  Local business taxes may thus be used to finance local infrastructure for 
business, to lower the firm's operating costs via communal services, and so forth.  Cost-
reducing effects might also show up indirectly, for instance in labor productivity when the 
                         
3 It should be noted in passing that the accountability principle also calls for autonomy in 
local public borrowing. 
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quality of the local labor force improves through education, recreational facilities or health 
care. 
The benefit-link principle may also call for an intermediate level of government whenever 
local benefits exhibit spillovers that accrue to a region rather than to a locality.  In this case, 
benefits can be "internalized" for the beneficiaries of a region, and the tax be seen as a 
market equivalent for the service consumed.  This could eventually be achieved through 
negotiated payments among groups of municipalities that share the costs of a supraregional 
local service; it may also be achieved by the establishment of functional regional bodies or 
districts (like utilities for water and energy supply, or waste disposal).4   
 
2.3 Non-distortion 
Taxes should be non-distortive in that they do not affect allocation decisions in the private 
sector; taxation should ideally be "neutral" in that sense. Most of the existing taxes fail on 
this criterion, but market choice is typically limited within the nation as a whole, which works 
as a barrier against non-neutrality at that level. At the municipal stratum, however, the 
criterion has a particular importance since taxpayers can always avoid a high level of local 
tax by shifting the tax base to low-tax jurisdictions. This leads to horizontal tax competition 
among local government with potentially ruinous consequences for the municipalities' ability 
to raise tax revenue at all. 
Horizontal tax competition among jurisdictions has two dimensions: (i) it imposes discipline 
on the variability of tax rates; and (ii) it restricts taxation to tax bases that cannot easily be 
transferred to other municipalities.  
The first issue vanishes if all municipalities impose the same tax rate. This could either be 
achieved through national legislation or through horizontal cooperation. Yet uniform rates 
are in conflict with the accountability principle and should be avoided under this aspect. 
Furthermore, some regional variation in tax rates is likely to be tolerated by taxpayers. This 
is in view of the benefit-tax principle as long as these variations reflect the regional pattern 
of demand for public services. Thus tax-rate variability is desirable and--within the limits 
imposed by the benefit-tax principle--also feasible. Ruinous competition--by which local 
governments underbid each other through lowering tax rates mutually until they reach a 
zero-level--can be avoided by national legislation that imposes a "floor" on local tax rates.5 
The second issue is usually addressed by selecting an immovable local tax base. As long as 
the tax base cannot be shifted to other jurisdictions, taxation is neutral and efficient (in the 
sense that it does not exhibit "excess burden"). The argument is in strong support of a local 
property tax and a local income tax based on the residence principle. It also favors a local 
business tax. In particular a local land tax seems to be an ideal candidate under this 
guideline.  
                         
4 In the United States, even education is organized in this fashion -- through school 
districts.  While education is, of course, a service, it involves substantial "externalities" 
(benefits) for society as a whole, which renders it intrinsically different from a quasi-private 
service like water and electricity supply.  This must also affect the financing of the service.  
In particular, it calls for equalizing grants in order to establish regional equity of educational 
opportunities, and/or to compensate for regional spillover effects.  Financing education 
according to a pure benefit-tax principle is thus inappropriate.  
5 This approach was also adopted by the European Union with regard to her member 
countries in the case of VAT and excise taxation. 
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While land is indeed physically immobile, the tax base of a land tax may not be, however. 
This is the case whenever municipalities have the right to define their own valuation rules or 
to concede tax preferences and exemptions at their discretion. Under these circumstances, 
the tax base might be eroded although the physical base remains untouched and is, of 
course, immobile.  
This calls for national legislation as to the definition of the local tax bases. Valuation rules, 
tax preferences and exemptions relating to local tax bases should all be uniform throughout 
the nation in order to avoid the de facto erosion of a base that is physically immobile. With 
standard rules for the tax base, no tax benefits can be reaped by the inefficient cross 
hauling of tax bases from one municipality to another.  The only incentive to reallocate 
resources from one jurisdiction to another should subsist in the differential of tax rates.   
Standard rules for local tax bases are also commendable in view of our next point, regional 
fairness. Horizontal tax competition among municipalities must, however, be allowed to 
operate--as is required under the principles of accountability and public service efficiency 
(benefit-tax link). However, it should be restricted to the setting of tax rates only.6 
 
2.4 Regional equity and long-term efficiency 
Local taxation should ideally reflect a regionally equitable revenue pattern for reasons of 
distributional justice among jurisdictions. This is, of course, a pure value judgment, yet it 
may also be warranted on political grounds if social fairness and cohesion of the nation are 
felt to enhance political stability. On these grounds, taxes on bases that are unevenly 
distributed across jurisdictions (like natural resources) are not suited for local use because 
they usually entail large regional inequities. The regional-fairness principle is difficult to 
realize in practice since the distribution of most tax bases can be expected to be regionally 
inequitable to some degree.  A local turnover tax is, however, closely linked to local 
economic activity, and it would rank higher, on this scale, than most other taxes. 
The principle of regional equity contradicts the aforementioned neutrality argument which 
views the local immobility of the tax base as efficiency improving. Indeed, natural resources-
-like land--are locationally immobile and should rank high as local tax bases on neutrality 
grounds. But those regions that are devoid of such resources often perceive this as unfair. 
Moreover, the neutrality argument takes a narrow view on efficiency as it dwells on the non-
interference of taxation with the allocation of private goods; it disregards the benefit-tax-
link criterion, which stresses the more efficient use of public goods.  
Under the benefit-tax link argument, natural resource taxation at the local level should be 
avoided. This is because it is most unlikely that local public services and infrastructure 
financed through local resource taxation would enhance collective welfare and/or be 
sustainable in the longer run.7 Economic history is full of examples where a temporary 
resource boom has financed local investments that failed to produce the expected returns 
over a longer term. More generally, the longer-term rates of return of natural resources 
                         
6 Restricting tax competition among local governments to the setting of the tax rate has the 
further advantage of reducing information costs of taxpayers. If tax base competition is 
allowed, the information requirements for locational decisions--in particular of businesses--
might become formidable. Undesirable transaction costs pertaining to the non-transparency 
of the tax system must result. 
7 Moreover, natural resources evaluated at world market prices might prove to be a very 
volatile and unreliable revenue source, which must rank low on the next criterion for local 
taxation to be discussed. 
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seem to be higher when invested nation- (or even world-) wide rather than confined to the 
region of origin. It is thus preferable to tax natural resources at the national level not only 
for reasons of regional fairness, but also for reasons of longer-term efficiency.  
In practice, a balance has to be struck between the local government's interest to have its 
citizens benefit from the wealth of local resources, and the nation's interest to avoid large 
regional inequities and/or to make more efficient use of resources in the longer-term. This 
usually calls for some revenue-sharing arrangement between the local and the national 
governments--which can take various forms and rests ultimately on political negotiation. It 
must be stressed, however, that this type of tax sharing may not only be more equitable 
than exclusive tax assignment rules; it may also be efficiency-enhancing, a fact that is not 
always realized by scholars of fiscal federalism. 
 
2.5 Reliability and stability of tax bases 
Local governments have to provide services on a continuous and reliable basis; local 
infrastructure should also expand incessantly with larger, bulky investments being financed 
either through borrowing or with the assistance of higher-level governments.  
While borrowing must, in principle, be available for local governments to bridge emerging 
revenue gaps, this should neither be used on a recurrent basis, nor for macroeconomic 
stabilization purposes at that level.  However, steady outlay performance calls for a reliable 
and sustainable revenue base, a base that remains largely sheltered from the cyclical 
variations of economic activity. It is therefore questionable whether municipalities should be 
given the progressive personal income taxes because these tend to exhibit greater 
fluctuations over the business cycle than other taxes--although local income taxation might 
be commendable for other reasons. This explains why local income taxes are typically 
proportional.8 Where local governments are allowed to piggyback on a national personal 
income tax, a proportional surcharge on the tax base is often preferred to a surcharge on 
national taxes due or paid. 
A local business tax would also rank low on the account of revenue-stability, because local 
business activities might be subject to large fluctuations over the cycle; it may also be an 
unreliable revenue source if local businesses face a longer-lasting structural crisis. However, 
the conclusion is not as straightforward as that. It hinges on the type of business tax 
employed that varies significantly among countries. 
This is not the place to look more closely into local business taxation as such. However, the 
various forms of business taxation employ very different tax bases. Business activities are 
assessed for tax purposes on the basis of local (gross or net) turnover, of local value-added, 
the local wage bill, local business capital, or local profits. Sometimes, effective cash or 
accrual accounting figures are used; sometimes the tax base is defined in legal terms that 
are independent from business decisions (for instance standard valuation rules). In some 
cases the business tax is similar to a minimum tax on notional capital or notional returns.9 
And often, the business tax appears in the form of a schedular tax with different 
combinations of tax bases.  
                         
8 Sometimes, the local income tax base is also subject to a maximum for that reason, as 
implicitly in the German local income-tax-sharing arrangements. 
9 The German "Gewerbesteuer" has elements of a minimum tax in that business capital 
defined by standard valuation rules (that incorporate parts of long-term debt) is taxed; also 
the business profit tax base includes part of interests paid on long-term debt which is more 
reliable and stable than a profit tax base on its own. 
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The local incidence of these tax bases (for instance, what is local profit?) is not always clear 
where firms operate at a supraregional level. In these cases, the distribution of a compound 
national tax base (for instance, national profits) onto municipalities is effected by a standard 
procedure based on obvious local variables (like local turnover or the wage bill), or a 
combination of such criteria. 
Obviously, no general conclusion can be drawn on the reliability and stability of a local 
business tax under these circumstances. A minimum tax on local capital is certainly less 
volatile than a local profits tax. A local tax on gross turnover or on the wage bill would rank 
somewhere in between. Furthermore, it has been argued that a local minimum tax on capital 
must lead to perilous erosion of the local capital stock when firms do not make profits and 
still have to pay tax. This could undermine the longer-term reliability of the tax base itself. 
These problems encountered within the realm of local business taxation lead us to our next 
point--the role of local tax sharing as an insurance device. 
 
2.6 Tax-sharing as implicit insurance 
It is well known that individuals may prefer a reliable and stable certainty-equivalent to 
volatile and unstable revenue. For this certainty-equivalent they are willing to sacrifice 
resources and pay an insurance premium.10 Where risks can be pooled and be defined 
empirically, private companies will supply corresponding insurance contracts--provided the 
government establishes rules for orderly market operations.  
Similarly, local governments have an interest to stabilize their revenue basis and may be 
willing to trade-in volatile sources of revenue for more reliable and steady elements. Take, 
for instance, the case where local budgets depend largely on a local business profits tax. 
This tax can be expected to be highly volatile in response to the business cycle and produce 
little or no tax revenue during recession. In cases where the municipality depends on a large 
local employer, the situation could even become critical if the company is forced to go out of 
business or incurs bankruptcy. This will put strain on the local budget just at a time when 
revenues are most needed to cope with a local unemployment problem. 
Revenue risks and structural uncertainty form yet another rationale for tax sharing between 
the lower tier and higher-level governments. Again, tax sharing could be welfare enhancing 
and improve efficiency. In Germany, for instance, local governments have, at one point, 
handed over a share of their genuine business tax to the state and central governments in 
exchange for a share of personal income tax. This swap of revenue bases through mutual 
tax sharing represents an implicit insurance device for the local sector since resources of the 
business tax are pooled and handed back in the form of a more reliable revenue source, 
which hinges on overall macroeconomic performance.11  
This form of tax sharing may be an interesting model for China in the future where the 
corporation tax is assigned, at present, to regional jurisdictions according to the principle of 
ownership. While regional governments may be reluctant to share this revenue source in 
periods of rapid growth and buoyancy, they may be inclined to reconsider their attitude in 
periods of normal activity or even recession. 
                         
10 The analysis was first provided by von Neumann-Morgenstern and is found in any 
textbook on risky decision-making. 
11 In a strict sense, pooling the risks was not the only motive of the sharing arrangements, 
which could have been effected entirely without bringing in the personal income tax. The 
fact that personal income tax has a stronger buoyancy than the local business tax led to a 
strengthening of local revenue over the longer term. 
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Local tax sharing poses, again, the problem of devising a horizontal regional apportionment 
formula for the shared taxes. Again, various criteria can be employed, although the most 
prominent feature is the derivation principle. Yet other criteria are also used where this leads 
to regional inequities. Local turnover, local value-added, the local wage bill, or local capital 
installed have already been mentioned when discussing the business tax before. Moreover, 
local tax sharing arrangements may include equalization provisions: an equal per-capita 
component or standardized needs criteria based on statistical information outside the 
control of municipalities. It is questionable, however, whether the central government should 
engage in local horizontal equalization. The central level should ideally concentrate on 
equalizing revenue among states or provinces, and leave local redistribution to the middle 
tier. Provincial equalization of local government finance should, however, be subject to some 
general principles for the whole nation, which is achieved through framework legislation at 
the central level. 
 
2.7 Administrative simplicity 
Local taxes have to be administered by all municipalities alike, large or small.  Since smaller 
jurisdictions face potentially higher administrative costs per unit of revenue raised than 
larger ones, the local tax system as a whole is constrained by the formers' ability to 
administer the taxes.  Otherwise, regional inequities would result from the effective variance 
in taxes collected.  This calls for a simple local tax system.  
Administrative simplicity works against many of the taxes that rank high according to other 
criteria of local taxation. A local income tax, a local VAT, a local business tax may all be 
commendable under most criteria, yet they are cumbersome to administer at the local level. 
Even a property tax, the ideal local tax candidate for most scholars of federalism, rates 
poorly under administrative aspects since it requires sophisticated valuation rules in order to 
be efficient.12  
In many instances there are solutions to administrative problems, however.  
First, the design of local taxes can be tailored to administrative conditions. For instance, a 
local business tax can operate under a nationally standardized tax base that is broad, based 
on simple cash flow accounting and focused on easily identifiable criteria such as turnover or 
wages paid. Since the tax is payable only by a small number of business firms, all local 
governments should be in a position to levy such a tax.  
Second, local tax policy can make use of existing administrative procedures and government 
or non-government institutions.  For example, a local income tax could be tagged on the 
centrally levied income tax in the form of a surcharge on the base or a piggyback tax on the 
central tax.  More complicated valuation procedures, like those required under a local 
property tax, could be administered at the county rather than the local level--eventually by 
delegation.  And some taxes can take the form of surcharges on services rendered by private 
or semi-public companies and utilities, like surcharges on electricity or telephone bills, or on 
the cost of water supplied.13 The companies that provide the service can easily administer all 
such levies at low costs, and the rates of the surcharges can be tailored to the local 
                         
12 Valuation can, of course, be avoided if the tax base is a simple physical measure, like 
square meters for land, yet this fails to take the economic aspects of land use into account 
and cannot be considered to be efficient. 
13 A surcharge on the water bill would also be closely related to the cost of sewerage. It can 
thus be considered a user charge in accordance with the benefit-tax principle, enhance local 
service efficiency, and also finance the protection of the environment. 
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preferences of the municipality. Local governments should, however, pay for administrative 
services rendered by other government or non-government institutions in order to avoid 
inefficiencies. A zero-cost tax administration would undoubtedly lead to excessively 
bureaucratic procedures over the longer run, and it repudiates the principle of 
accountability. 
 
3.  Summary and conclusions 
It is obvious that not all criteria for local taxation discussed are consistent with each other or 
could be realized fully at the same time. And it is clear that they jointly limit the scope for 
local taxation severely. As can be seen from chart 1, only the Scandinavian countries are able 
to raise a significant proportion of GDP in terms of local taxes, mainly through a local 
income tax or an income tax surcharge. All other countries depicted in the chart raise, on 
average, only less than 5 percent of GDP in terms of local taxes with a high of 8 percent for 
Austria, and a low of 2 percent for Australia (2.5 percent for Italy). All countries make 
substantial use of complementary grants to the local sector, albeit at varying degrees. It is 
thus an illusion to believe that local services could exclusively by financed through own local 
taxes. This is true even for the high-tax Scandinavian countries. 
Furthermore, the choice of taxes for local government is also limited. Disregarding smaller 
taxes--like gambling taxes--more substantial local revenue can be expected from local 
turnover or sales taxes, a local VAT, a local personal income tax, a local business tax, and a 
local property tax. A local turnover tax and--a fortiori--a local VAT has a number of 
drawbacks, as it must interfere with similar taxes levied at the national level. Even as a 
piggyback tax, a local VAT poses problems through the tax credit mechanism. It is not clear 
whether a local tax credit should be accorded to inventories or the purchase of investment 
goods, for instance, or which jurisdiction should ultimately bear the cost of the tax credit. A 
similar question arises as to the redemption of tax for exports (respectively the zero-rating 
of exports). This is why all countries but one14 that employ a VAT have refrained from 
allowing the local sector to penetrate that tax area.  
A local turnover tax--unless levied as a single-stage retail sales tax--may face the problem 
of "cascading" which is the cumulating of tax as goods are transacted among taxable units in 
the process of production and distribution. For high local tax rates, cascading exhibits 
significant allocative distortions, and even exports may bear the tax unless provisions are 
made to redeem traders.15 A cascading sales tax will have a limited scope, as tax rates must 
remain low in order to check emerging distortions.16  
A local retail sales tax may become operational, however, be consistent with accountability, 
and even work as a benefit-tax. It is, however, more difficult to administer--because of the 
greater number of taxpayers and the difficulty to impose bookkeeping. Such a tax is thus 
susceptible to large de facto inequities through the negative distributional impact of 
effective tax collection. 
                         
14 Brazil operates a sales tax/VAT at all three levels of government with formidable 
administrative and conceptual problems. 
15 A redemption scheme for local tax on exports raises the question of how and who should 
finance the scheme. It could also raise suspicion abroad and face countervailing action of 
foreign trading partners under the GATT. 
16 Hungary operates a local net turnover tax as a business tax with relatively low rates 
(maximum 0.8 percent). 
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More promising are the local personal income and local business taxes. The former should 
take the form of a surcharge or piggyback tax on the national income tax for reasons of 
administrative simplicity. Yet under the conditions prevailing in China, where personal 
income levels are still very low, a local income tax will raise little revenue whatever form may 
be chosen. This condition will, hopefully, improve in the not too distant future. A local 
personal income tax will then become an interesting option for China. A local business tax 
is, however, feasible in the short run if care is taken to keep the tax base simple.   
Alas, not much can be expected from the local property tax either. While it is the ideal local 
tax in theory, the tax seems to raise little revenue in practice. Only the Anglo-Saxon world 
appears to raise a more substantial portion of public revenue from this tax. The reasons for 
the poor performance of the property tax in most countries are found in political 
impediments that work at the local level, more than in administrative complexities in 
determining the base. After all, people prefer to avoid the local tax burden and local 
politicians often have no other choice than to collude with local citizen if they want to stay in 
power. Nevertheless, a local property tax--albeit fraught with administrative and political 
problems--is an important component of any system of local finance both for reasons of 
efficiency and equity. 
Whatever local tax system may be established in a country, there will be need for grants and 
there should be local discretion as to borrowing. However, the tax-grants system must be 
designed in a way as to allow the criteria discussed to operate. Keys to a successful system 
of local finance are the free working of accountability and the local sector's responsiveness 
to local demand. This requires a local tax system that responds to demand for local public 
services--at least at the margin. As to the benefit-tax link, user charges must play an ever-
increasing role in the context of local finance.  
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